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The distribution sector or trade sector – the two terms are 
used synonymously in this article – is a key stakeholder 
in developed economies. In 2007, the trade branches as 
a whole – automobile, wholesale and retail – accounted 
for 13.1 p.c. of value added in Belgium, and 14.1 p.c. of 
total employment. Over and above its direct weight in the 
economy, the distribution sector is an essential element 
because of its role as an ultimate channel through which 
all ﬁ   nal consumption goods, the main component of 
domestic expenditure, have to pass.
Just like other major branches of the economy, over the 
last few decades, the trade sector has seen – and is still 
going through – radical changes linked to globalisation and 
technological advance. The most important developments 
are the concentration of retail trade, its integration with 
the wholesale trade, the internationalisation of the large 
retail groups’ business and the incorporation of ICT, which 
is leading to a reorganisation of modes of distribution.
This article seeks to outline the situation of the distribution 
sector in Belgium, with particular emphasis on the impact 
of regulation. The regulatory burden is being closely moni-
tored by the IMF as well as the OECD and its weight in 
Europe, and particularly in Belgium, is often singled out 
for criticism. According to both these institutions, greater 
ﬂ  exibility in the rules in force in the sector should help 
to stimulate activity and employment. Referring to the 
example of the United States, the arguments put forward 
are that this kind of deregulation policy would lead to an 
increase in employment in the sector, notably among low-
skilled workers, while also boosting productivity growth. 
The trade sector does actually appear to be one of the 
reasons for Europe’s lagging behind in potential output 
growth, notably because of a less advanced integration of 
ICT into the structure of distribution channels. By reduc-
ing barriers to entry, deregulation would also bring about 
greater competition, as well as having a positive impact 
on productivity, and, consequently, exert a downward 
inﬂ  uence on price levels and inﬂ  ation.
The article analyses these issues by comparing as far as 
possible Belgium’s performance with that of neighbour-
ing countries. The ﬁ  rst chapter deals with the regulatory 
burden. This issue is tackled by using existing international 
indicators on this subject, as well as by reviewing the main 
legislation governing retail trade in Belgium. Chapter 2 
gives a detailed analysis of the level and growth of pro-
ductivity in the trade sector in Belgium over the last few 
years. By determining conditions for market access and 
carrying out a commercial activity, the regulatory frame-
work also has some inﬂ  uence on the market structure, on 
the type of shops there are and, ultimately, on the degree 
of competition. Furthermore, productivity and the degree 
of competition tend to interact, not least because a higher 
level of competition within the sector forces companies to 
be more productive in order to survive or leads to the dis-
appearance of the least productive ﬁ  rms. Market structure 
and competition-related aspects are addressed in chap-
ter 3, which deals speciﬁ  cally with the food retailing sub-
sector. Chapter 4 looks at the impact of competition on 
prices in Belgium and neighbouring countries. The main 
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CHART 1  REGULATION INDICATORS IN RETAIL TRADE (1)
  (scale of 0 to 6, with a higher score indicating tighter regulation)
Source : OECD (Product Market Regulation summary indicators).
(1)  Including automobile trade.
lessons to be drawn from the analysis are summed up in 
the conclusion. The ﬁ  nal part of the article also touches 
on the economic policy implications.
1. Regulation 
To get an idea of the degree of regulation in an economy 
or a speciﬁ  c sector, one possible approach is to refer to 
summary indicators. These indicators aim to translate 
the main aspects of a piece of legislation in force into 
“scores”, which makes it easier to assess the more or less 
restrictive nature of the law. These indicators have the 
advantage of being comparable internationally and pos-
sibly over time as well. The most frequently used indicator 
in this ﬁ   eld is certainly the Product Market Regulation 
(PMR) indicator calculated by the OECD which enables 
the regulatory burden to be measured for the economy 
as a whole. A sub-set of questions concerns retail trade, 
a sector for which a speciﬁ  c regulation indicator is estab-
lished according to the detailed methodology set out in 
box 1. In order to carry out a more in-depth analysis, and 
given the limitations affecting this type of summary indi-
cator, it is worth examining these yardsticks in light of the 
main laws in force in the retail trade sector.
According to the PMR indicators, Belgium had the second 
most binding regulation in retail trade out of the twenty-
seven countries examined by the OECD in 2008, second 
only to Luxembourg. With an overall score of 3.7 on a 
scale of 0 to 6, Belgium thus ranks above the three main 
neighbouring countries, whose scores ranged from 2.1 
for the Netherlands to 3.1 for France, with Germany 
in the middle at 2.4. Generally speaking, the countries 
where the retail trade sector is the least regulated are not 
members of the EU, with the exception of Sweden which 
has the lowest score of just 0.5. 
Over the years, Belgium’s overall score has remained below 
4, ﬂ  uctuating between 3.7 in 1998 and 3.9 in 2003 and 
back down to 3.7 in 2008. At the same time, its ranking 
has gradually worsened compared with the other countries 
examined by the OECD, moving up from ﬁ  fth to second 
place in the space of ten years. The analysis of intermedi-
ary indicators, which cover barriers to market entry, opera-
tional restrictions and price controls in particular, suggests 
that this overall trend breaks down into a deterioration as 
regards barriers to entry – especially when it comes to rules 
governing the establishment of large outlets – and some 
improvement with price controls, although this point is 
still given less weight in the summary index. It should also 
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Box 1 –   Methodology for the OECD indicators of retail trade regulation
Since the end of the 1990s, the OECD has built up a system of indicators aimed at measuring regulatory trends on 
product markets in the euro area countries. These indicators are used in particular for identifying economic policy 
priorities in the framework of the Growth Strategy the Paris-based institution has developed.
The indicators are either calculated for the economy as a whole, or for speciﬁ  c sectors, on the basis of qualitative 
information collected from the different states, and then normalised over a scale of 0 to 6. A higher score is taken 
to mean tighter regulation. The PMR indicator is constructed as a pyramid, aggregating the answers to the basic 
questions by levels corresponding to various themes, to eventually arrive at a summary indicator.
The OECD indicator for the retail trade sector is based on six detailed indicators, grouping together one or more 
questions, relating to :
1. registration in the commercial register (for the sale of food products) ;
2. licences or permits needed to engage in commercial activity (for the sale of food products) ;
3. speciﬁ  c regulation of large outlets (minimum surface area from which it applies) ;
4. protection of existing ﬁ  rms ;
5.   opening hours (whether there is any regulation or not and, subsidiarily, whether it is of a national or local nature) ;
6. price controls (questions sub-divided per product category).
At an intermediary level, three themes are singled out, which summarise each time the six above-mentioned basic 
indicators, using a different weighting resulting from a factor analysis. However, the score in each of these three 
themes depends excessively on certain of these basic indicators, so, by simpliﬁ  cation, each of the indicators can 
ﬁ  rst be associated with a speciﬁ  c theme :
– barriers to entry (0.42) : mainly indicators 1, 2 and 3 ;
– operational restrictions (0.34) : mainly indicators 4 and 5 ;
– price controls (0.24) : mainly indicator 6.
Finally, the summary retail trade indicator is obtained from the weighted average of the six basic indicators, 
again using a different weighting. Alternatively, it can be taken as a weighted average of the scores of the three 
intermediary themes, which give a relatively greater weight to entry barriers and a smaller weight to price controls, 
as shown by the ﬁ  gures given in brackets above.
The OECD publishes these indicators at ﬁ  ve-year intervals. An update for 2008 was published in February 2009, so 
that a chronological analysis is now possible on a relatively harmonised basis for the years 1998, 2003 and 2008. 
While the simplicity of this indicator is undoubtedly an asset, it also shows up its limitations. The criteria selected 
can sometimes actually give a narrow view of reality  ; the questions often call for blunt binary answers (yes/no). 
The ﬁ  ndings of this indicator therefore need to be put into perspective, by looking into the legislation in force in 
Belgium. Moreover, the OECD indicator provides an interesting analytical framework for this exercise, as its very 
structure enables it to take into account the three laws that are the most frequently cited as potential sources of 
barriers to retail trade, such as rules for setting up new shops, opening hours and days, and business practices, 
the latter covering a wide range of provisions (price controls, sales, joint sales, etc.).
be noted that, in the areas where the Belgian score has 
held steady over the last ten years, Belgium’s position has 
shown some deterioration vis-à-vis the other countries. 
Even though some regulatory provisions in the retail trade 
sector have not been amended in our country, they have 
turned out to be more and more restrictive compared with 
the measures to relax the regulatory framework put in 
place in other countries.
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Among the three intermediary themes, Belgium’s score 
on barriers to entry rose steadily from 2.6 to 3.4 between 
1998 and 2008. The speciﬁ  c regulations governing large 
outlets are the main reason behind this deterioration, 
since the rules on establishment of hypermarkets are 
often regarded as one of the main barriers to entry into 
the distribution sector. These rules potentially target 
several objectives  : land use planning, environmental pro-
tection by avoiding massive trafﬁ  c ﬂ  ows towards the big 
commercial centres located on the outskirts of towns, pro-
tection of small retailers, etc. At the same time, these pro-
visions can have a harmful impact of limiting economies 
of scale, protecting existing ﬁ  rms from competition from 
new entrants and hold up modernisation of the sector. 
Since March 2005, the establishment of new hypermar-
kets in Belgium has come under the scope of the so-called 
“Ikea” Law  (1), which replaced the “loi cadenas” dating 
from 1975. The “Ikea” Law aimed to facilitate such estab-
lishments, by simplifying and speeding up the decision-
making procedure, while also widening the scope for 
applicants to appeal. The most striking feature of this law 
has been a shift in the decision-making centre from the 
national to the local level. The law makes provision for 
three scenarios :
–   for a (limited) extension or a (nearby) relocation of an 
existing shop, notifying the municipality authority is 
sufﬁ  cient ;
–   for the establishment of new retail outlets with a com-
mercial surface of between 400 and 1,000 m2, the 
College of mayors and aldermen must reach a decision 
within 50 days ;
–   for the establishment of new retail outlets with a com-
mercial surface exceeding 1,000 m2, the College also 
has to ask for the prior opinion of the national Socio-
Economic Committee for the Retail Sector (CSEND) 
– which brings the time-limit for a decision up to 
70 days –, but this opinion is not binding, as it was 
before. For retail outlets of more than 2,000 m2, the 
neighbouring municipalities must also be informed so 
that their observations can be made.
So, all in all, the time limit for reaching a decision is a max-
imum of 70 days. In all cases, the decision is assumed to 
be favourable if the statutory response period is exceeded.
Although some of the “Ikea” Law’s provisions are still 
open to criticism, notably the participation in CSEND of 
the parties involved (see below), there is no doubt that 
the legislation has made it easier to establish new large 
retail outlets than previously. In practice, since 2005, most 
requests for setting up commercial establishments have 
gained the go-ahead. In its 2005 country survey, the 
OECD had given a positive opinion of the new law, reck-
oning that it reduced barriers to entry for large outlets, 
by making the authorisation procedure more transparent 
and by cutting by half the statutory response period. 
This improvement is not reﬂ  ected in the PMR indicators. 
Instead, Belgium’s score got worse between 2003 and 
2008, owing to the fact that the sole criterion used by 
the OECD concerns the retail ﬂ  oor space above which the 
regulatory requirements apply and this surface area was 
lowered to 400 m2 under the so-called “Ikea” Law.
Among the neighbouring countries, there is speciﬁ  c legis-
lation governing new commercial establishments in both 
Luxembourg and France, and is just as restrictive accord-
ing to the OECD criteria, since its application thresholds 
refer to comparable surface areas. On the other hand, 
the score obtained generally tends to be more favour-
able in countries where there is no speciﬁ  c  legislation 
for large outlets, but where the establishment of shops 
is subject to general land use planning rules, which are 
sometimes quite strict. This, for instance, is the case in the 
Netherlands, a country where retail trade tends to be con-
centrated in the towns and where the presence of hyper-
markets is unusual, but which nevertheless gets a score of 
zero, reﬂ  ecting total deregulation, according to the OECD 
criteria. These examples show that the quantitative ﬁ  gures 
from the OECD indicators should be interpreted carefully, 
by putting them in their correct context.
It is for operational restrictions that Belgium gets its worst 
results, scoring a maximum of 6 for the two main basic 
indicators in this category. First of all, existing ﬁ  rms are 
considered to be protected, because, on the one hand, 
representatives of professional organisations are involved 
in the granting of authorisations and licences through 
their participation in the CSEND and, on the other hand, 
some products can only be sold by outlets that have a 
de jure monopoly, such as the sale of medicines in phar-
macies, for example. 
Another important criterion taken into consideration is 
legislation on shop opening hours. This is sensitive issue, 
as it touches on cultural aspects linked to life in society. 
From a purely theoretical point of view, the question can 
bring the various interest groups concerned (consumers, 
workers, enterprises) into conﬂ  ict, and the likely impact 
can change from the short to long term. The main argu-
ments put forward in favour of longer opening hours are 
greater convenience for the consumer, made all the more 
necessary by societal developments (such as increased 
participation of women in the labour market), greater  (1)  Law of 13 August 2004 on the authorisation of commercial establishments.
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TABLE 1  INDICATORS OF RETAIL TRADE REGULATION  (1) 
IN BELGIUM









1. Registration in commercial 
register   ................... 1.5 1.5 2.0
2. Licences or permits   ......... 2.0 2.0 2.0
3. Speciﬁc regulation of large 
outlets  (3)   .................. 4.0 5.0 6.0
 
Barriers to entry  ..............   2.6   2.9   3.4
  (12)   (8)   (6)
  p.m. 2008  : 
DE (2.1) – FR (2.6) – NL (2.1)
 
4. Protection of existing ﬁrms  . . 6.0 6.0 6.0
5. Opening hours and days  (4) 6.0 6.0 6.0
 
Operational restrictions  ........   4.8   4.8   5.0
  (5)   (1)   (1)
  p.m. 2008  : 
DE (2.9) – FR (4.7) – NL (2.4)
 
6. Price controls   .............. 4.0 4.0 2.0
 
Price controls  ................   4.0   4.1   2.6
  (2)   (2)   (5)
  p.m. 2008  : 
DE (2.4) – FR (1.7) – NL (1.8)
 
    Summary indicator  ..........     3.7     3.9     3.7
    (5)     (3)     (2)
  p.m. 2008  : 
DE (2.4) – FR (3.1) – NL (2.1)
Source  : OECD (Product Market Regulation indicators).
(1) Including automobile trade.
(2) The ﬁgures in brackets indicate Belgium's position among a number of OECD 
countries varying from 26 to 29 depending on the indicators used and the years 
covered.
(3) Indicator based solely on the threshold ﬂoor area above which any regulatory 
requirements apply.
(4) Whether or not there are any national or regional/local regulations.
 
proﬁ  tability for the shops, whether through faster depre-
ciation of ﬁ  xed costs or a higher turnover, and expanded 
activity, higher employment and lower prices at both 
sectoral level and in the economy as a whole. Opponents 
of extended opening hours, especially on Sundays, doubt 
that the anticipated beneﬁ  ts, and especially a signiﬁ  cant 
increase in turnover, do actually materialise, and tend to 
emphasise the inconvenience for the workers, as well as 
the societal need for a common rest period away from all 
economic activity.
Research work attempting to assess the impact of experi-
ence in liberalising opening hours in some countries has 
tended to produce rather mixed results. Not surprisingly, 
the winners seems to be the consumers. Beyond that, the 
overall impact on prices appears to be modest  : initially, 
there is an upward effect to cover the increase in oper-
ating costs, and also as a result of the potential rise in 
market power of surviving ﬁ  rms, after certain competitors 
cease trading  ; and then a downward inﬂ  uence owing to 
the efﬁ  ciency gains achieved and the arrival of new com-
petitors on the market. Turnover and employment would 
tend to increase slightly, but the jobs created often offers 
less attractive work conditions. In Belgium, opening hours 
and days in retail trade are governed by a law adopted on 
10 November 2006, which streamlined and updated the 
previous legislation from 1960 and 1973, without chang-
ing the main principles enshrined in these laws. As far as 
opening days are concerned, the principle is one day off a 
week, or more precisely a 24-hour period of uninterrupted 
closure starting on any day – normally but not necessar-
ily Sunday – at 5 am or 1 pm. As for opening hours, the 
principle is authorised opening between 5 am and 8 pm 
from Monday to Thursday and on Saturdays, and until 
9 pm on Fridays and on the eve of public holidays. Three 
kinds of derogations are possible : according to the type of 
outlet (transit points, newspaper sales points, motor fuel 
outlets, etc.), for exceptional circumstances (a maximum 
of 15 days a year), and in tourist areas.
The criterion taken into account by the OECD for estab-
lishing the PMR indicators is the existence of any regula-
tion in this ﬁ  eld and if it takes on a national dimension 
this is regarded as an aggravating factor. On this basis, 
Belgium gets a maximum score of 6, like many other 
countries, despite the actual range of opening hours. 
Thus, the United Kingdom, a country where opening 
hours are virtually unlimited but nevertheless governed 
by speciﬁ  c legislation, has also been given a maximum 
score. Conversely, Germany gets a lower score, owing to 
the fact that regulations on opening hours fall within the 
competence of the Länder.
In order to better assess the ﬂ  exibility of rules on opening 
hours, their actual scope should be surveyed. Compared 
with the neighbouring countries, Belgium comes some-
where in the middle. Shops in Belgium are open more 
than they are in Germany, similar to opening hours 
in Luxembourg, albeit to a lesser extent than in the 
Netherlands (opening hours until 10 pm on weekdays 
and Saturdays), and especially in France and the United 
Kingdom, countries where the restrictions only concern 
Sundays. On the other hand, the shops in Belgium often 
opt on a voluntary basis for shorter opening hours than 
those allowed under the regulatory restrictions, something 
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which also tends to put their constraining nature into per-
spective. The collective labour agreements in force in the 
distribution sector probably play a part here. 
The OECD ‘s 2007 country survey was quite positive 
about the Belgian law adopted in 2006, pointing up the 
simpliﬁ   cation of the rules governing opening days and 
hours, as well as the extension of the potential number of 
Sunday openings. But once again, the improvement in the 
legislative framework is not reﬂ  ected in the PMR indicator 
score, even though it is acknowledged by the OECD.
Finally, price controls make up the last axis for assessing 
regulation in retail trade. This is the only area in which 
Belgium has improved its score and its ranking, with the 
intermediary indicator coming down from 4.1 in 2003 
to 2.6 in 2008, and Belgium itself dropping from 2nd 
to 5th place, thanks to the removal of price controls on 
bread and to the OECD’s taking into account, no doubt 
mistakenly, a presumed easing of petrol price ﬁ  xing. So, 
contrary to the impact of the “Ikea” Law or the regime 
governing opening hours, the PMR indicator score tends 
to overestimate somewhat the progress made in the ﬁ  eld 
of price controls.
In Belgium, price controls are governed by the Law of 
22 January 1945 on the economic regulation of prices, 
which also encompasses decrees ﬁ  xing maximum prices, 
prior announcements of prices in regulated sectors, pro-
gramme contracts, etc. A few other provisions affecting 
prices, such as labelling, discounts, seasonal sales, joint 
sales, closing-down sales, are covered by the Law on com-
mercial practices, consumer information and consumer 
protection, the latest version of which dates from 1999. 
In Belgium, there are plenty of provisions in this area, not 
often found in the other countries.
With its basic indicator, the OECD ﬁ   rst of all assesses 
whether any prices are ﬁ   xed in absolute terms, then 
whether there are any such price controls for certain 
product categories, such as staple goods, petrol, tobacco, 
alcohol, medicines, other categories. The overall score 
thus goes up with the number of products whose prices 
are subject to controls. By counting two categories of 
products subject to price controls, including medicines (an 
area in which price liberalisation had already been covered 
by an IMF recommendation in December 2008), Belgium 
is ranked in the middle, rather nearer the top than the 
bottom. It forms part of a group of countries, along with 
Germany and the Netherlands, where drug prices are 
also regulated. Five countries have a higher score, among 
them Luxembourg which additionally has price controls 
on tobacco and petrol. Conversely, thirteen countries 
have a lower score, including France (tobacco), the United 
States (alcohol) and the United Kingdom (medicines), 
along with four countries that do not have any price con-
trols, including Denmark and Sweden. 
In all, and despite the need to perhaps take a critical look 
at the OECD’s PMR indicators, it is worth noting that 
Belgium almost always has a score equal to or higher than 
that of its three main neighbours. This suggests that the 
retail trade regulatory framework is more restrictive there 
than elsewhere. Looking at the matter more closely, il 
appears that it is not so much the content of the legisla-
tive provisions as their actual existence, or even the sheer 
number of them, that leads to this view. When compared 
with the neighbouring countries, Belgium seems to 
suffer from a legislative inﬂ  ation syndrome, whereby any 
commercial practice is regarded as being controlled by 
speciﬁ  c legislation. Although Belgian legislation has been 
reshaped slightly over the last ten years, largely as a result 
of the transposition of EU Directives, a genuine effort 
to simplify and streamline existing laws still needs to be 
made. This is an important point because the perception 
that the market players have of barriers to doing business 
is sometimes more of a determining factor than the actual 
level of these obstacles. If potential competitors get the 
impression that the Belgian regulations are excessively 
heavy, they will hesitate before committing themselves to 
moving into this market, while the stakeholders already 
present will feel as though they are protected against the 
arrival of new entrants. This situation de facto restricts 
competition and can give rise to inefﬁ  ciencies. 
2. Productivity
Having given an overview of the degree of regulation in 
the distribution sector in Belgium in the previous chapter, 
we shall now try to ﬁ  nd out whether its relatively restric-
tive nature affects the performance of the sector in terms 
of business and productivity.
In order to do so, we draw on the EU KLEMS database, 
which provides statistics on economic activity and pro-
ductivity for most EU countries, as well as for the United 
States, covering all the various branches of the economy, 
including distribution. Compiled using methods harmo-
nised under the guidance of the EC, this database notably 
enables economic growth to be broken down according 
to the conventional determinants of growth accounting, 
labour, capital and total factor productivity. For this cal-
culation, it has the peculiarity of measuring the contribu-
tion of capital by using an estimate of the services that 
it provides, rather than directly from the capital stock, 
while also distinguishing ICT capital from non-ICT capital. 
Likewise, the contribution of labour input is sub-divided 
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CHART 2  STRUCTURE AND LEVEL OF PRODUCTIVITY IN THE 
DISTRIBUTION SECTOR
Sources : EU KLEMS database, March 2008 ; GGDC database on productivity levels, 
September 2008.
(1)  Per hour worked.
(2)  All branches of activity in the economy, with the exception of NACE branches 70 
(real estate) and 75-85 (public administration, education and health).
HOURLY PRODUCTIVITY IN THE DISTRIBUTION SECTOR 
AS A WHOLE
(2005 level, US indices = 1, unless otherwise stated)
Market branches (1)
DETERMINANTS OF HOURLY LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
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into two components, namely the volume of employment 
(hours worked) and workforce skills. 
Among the countries covered by the EU KLEMS database, 
the Belgian distribution sector had the highest hourly 
labour productivity rate in 2005. This was almost 40 p.c. 
higher than the rate observed in the United States, and 
70 p.c. above the EU15 level. Several EU Member States, 
most of which are neighbouring countries (the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Germany), recorded a higher level of produc-
tivity in the distribution sector than in the United States, 
with France in the same position as the latter. 
The generally higher productivity level of the Belgian 
distribution sector is partly due to its structure, that is, 
Belgium’s relative specialisation in the wholesale trade, 
which by its very nature is more productive than retail 
trade. Wholesale trade actually accounts for 40 p.c. of 
total trade in Belgium compared with a little more than 
30 p.c. in the EU15 and the United States. This degree 
of specialisation reﬂ  ects Belgium’s vocation as a logistics 
centre for the Benelux and Western Europe. Moreover, 
the products that are the most important in the Belgian 
wholesale trade are the same as those in which the indus-
trial sector is specialised  : intermediary goods (chemicals 
and diamonds), machinery and equipment (construction 
and textiles) and non-food consumer goods (household 
electrical appliances, television and radio, and glass).
Furthermore, the ﬁ  ndings obtained from annual accounts 
of companies show that the Belgian retail trade sector 
is among the most productive in the EU15. It is notably 
more productive than its German and Dutch counterparts, 
but a little less than the French retail sector.
As for the determinants, this higher productivity in the 
distribution sector in Belgium than in the United States 
is primarily evident in the extent to which two types 
of capital, ICT and non-ICT, are used and also in total 
factor productivity (TFP). While productivity in the Belgian 
economy as a whole is close to the rate recorded in the 
United States, performance appears quite outstanding in 
the distribution sector, notably because of the extent of 
ICT capital integrated into the production process. 
While Belgium has undoubtedly posted some remarkable 
performance as regards the productivity level reached in 
the distribution sector, it is quite a different picture when 
one observes growth of activity and productivity recorded 
in recent years. 
Belgian distribution has in fact featured among the least 
dynamic over the last ten years. Growth in real value 
added for the distribution as a whole averaged 1.1 p.c. a 







































CHART 3  GROWTH IN ACTIVITY AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE DISTRIBUTION SECTOR
Source : EU KLEMS database, March 2008.













































































Value added (percentage change)
BREAKDOWN OF GROWTH IN THE DISTRIBUTION SECTOR
(contribution to growth, in percentage points, unless 
otherwise stated ; 1995-2005)
Total Retail
US EU15 (1) BE US EU15 (1) BE
year from 1995 to 2005, compared with 2.1 p.c. in the 
EU15 and 4.4 p.c. in the United States. This growth lag 
behind the United States and the EU15 is evident in all 
three sub-branches of the distribution  sector. The average 
growth rate in the retail trade has been 0.8 p.c. in Belgium 
compared with 1.6 p.c. in the EU15 and 5.5 p.c. in the 
United States. 
A breakdown of the growth in activity into its main deter-
minants provides further insight into the source of the 
Belgian distribution sector’s growth deﬁ  cit. In both retail-
ing and the whole distribution sector, the contribution of 
the factors of production (labour and capital) to growth in 
activity in Belgium has been similar to or higher than that 
seen in other economies. Belgium notably stands out for 
its high contribution of the capital production factor and 
especially non-ICT capital. 
The divergences in growth performance compared with 
the United States have therefore largely originated from 
the differences in TFP, whether at the EU level or in 
Belgium itself where the gap is more pronounced. While 
the contribution of TFP to growth in the retail trade sector 
in the United States was on average 3.9 percentage points 
a year from 1995 to 2005, it was only 0.4 percentage 
point in the EU15 and even negative in Belgium, at –1. 
At this stage in the analysis, it is important to point out that 
the statistics on productivity levels should be interpreted 
even more cautiously than those measuring changes  : 
errors and omissions have wider consequences. One such 
example is the difﬁ  culty in measuring the volume of activ-
ity in the services sector, resulting partly from account 
being taken of the quality of service, which can lead to 
an under-estimation of growth of activity. Assuming that 
the production factor contributions are measured cor-
rectly, these calculation errors are reﬂ  ected in TFP, since it 
is calculated residually and, moreover, incorporates many 
factors which interact amongst one another. In principle, 
there is no reason to believe that these measurement 
errors are more determining in Belgium than elsewhere.
It would certainly be tempting to explain Belgium’s poor 
performance in recent years by a simple level effect  : 
the other countries, and the United States in particular, 
appear to have caught up with Belgium in this respect. 
But this line of reasoning conﬂ  icts with the fact that some 
countries – most notably the Netherlands – have also 
posted a high level of retail trade productivity and sus-
tained growth in the sector in recent years, while others 
(Italy and Portugal) have reported poor performance 
in both productivity levels and their recent productivity 
growth rates. 
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One argument often put forward to explain the European 
retail sector’s lag in productivity growth behind its 
American counterpart is the lack of – or the lag in – 
European investment in ICT. This investment automatically 
implies productivity gains (hard savings), a classic example 
being the introduction of bar codes in the retail sector. 
While this argument appears to be at least partly valid for 
the EU as a whole, it does not seem to hold for Belgium : 
on the contrary, the EU KLEMS database indicates that 
the contribution of ICT capital to growth has been higher 
in this country than elsewhere, both in the distribution 
sector as a whole and retail trade in particular. This ﬁ  nd-
ing squares with the intensive capitalisation of the Belgian 
economy, necessary to preserve its competitive edge given 
the high degree of openness of the economy and the level 
of labour costs.
Harder to quantify are the “soft savings” also generated 
by investment in ICT but obtained more or less intensively 
and even with some time lag as they require other adjust-
ments such as work organisation or managerial changes. 
They notably imply changes in supplier and customer 
behaviour (minimum stocks, just-in-time delivery, more 
detailed and readily available information on consumer 
habits, etc.). These soft savings can also result from 
investment made in related sectors  : one example being 
deregulation of road transport which has also helped the 
reorganisation of retail trade in the United States.
Regulation is also likely to have a major inﬂ  uence on pro-
duction factor efﬁ  ciency. For instance, land use planning 
requirements, which are stricter in Europe, have slowed 
down the expansion of American-style “big box” hyper-
markets, which are deemed to have played a signiﬁ  cant 
role in the rapid development of the distribution sector 
in the United States. Similarly, the prescribed restrictions 
on opening hours are considered by some to limit the 
potential scope for writing off innovation costs. Generally 
speaking, market opening and the encouragement of 
competition can promote innovation, and ultimately pro-
ductivity too. As far as Belgium is concerned, the relatively 
stringent legislation on distribution, or at least the fact that 
market players perceive it as being strict, probably hinders 
the full use of new technologies, despite their abundance, 
and therefore puts a brake on productivity growth.
Finally, the institutional and cultural context, as well as 
some geographic factors, may also inﬂ  uence performance 
in the distribution sector. For example, since innovation-
related productivity improvements can only be made 
by trial and error, it is important to have a favourable 
context here, focused on promoting the entrepreneurial 
spirit, overcoming the stigma of business failures and the 
possibility of rapidly starting up a business again. The 
way in which the labour market functions can also play 
a role here, since general rules or agreements between 
social partners can turn out to be more restrictive than 
the speciﬁ  c regulations governing the distribution sector. 
In the same vein, it can be noted that ﬁ  rms in the retail 
sector do not make full use of the range of opening hours 
permitted by the regulatory requirements. On the other 
hand, the small size of the Belgian market, combined with 
strong regional disparities, and especially along linguistic 
lines, are likely to restrict the market penetration rate of 
foreign ﬁ  rms. At the European level, the lack of harmoni-
sation of regulations between EU Member States, along 
with the persistent geographical and cultural fragmenta-
tion of markets despite the integration process, constitute 
a similar hurdle to the optimum functioning of the distri-
bution sector.
3. Competition 
For reasons of data availability, the analysis featuring in 
this part of the article focuses on the one segment of 
the retail trade sector with which the general public is 
the most familiar, namely the supermarkets, or more 
precisely self-service non-specialised food retailing  (1). This 
deﬁ  nition therefore excludes small specialised shops like 
bakeries, butcheries, small-scale grocer’s shops that are 
not self-service and whose product range is smaller. It 
also excludes non-food retailing, even though part of 
the product range of the outlets under consideration can 
include non-food goods, albeit to a minor extent. 
This sector accounts for roughly 40 p.c. of retail trade 
turnover in Belgium and the euro area, but this propor-
tion is higher in France and the Netherlands (close to 50 
and 60 p.c. respectively). Compared with the food trade 
as a whole, the non-specialised segment accounts for a 
little less than 90 p.c. of the total in Belgium and in the 
euro area, but more than 90 p.c. in our neighbours, with 
the exception of the Netherlands. This proportion is much 
lower in the southern countries, especially in Greece and 
Spain where the small-scale traditional shops are still more 
predominant.
According to data from AC Nielsen, the evolution of 
the number of shops in non-specialised food retailing 
in Belgium suggests a decrease due to the decline in 
traditional shops, and a parallel increase in the relative 
importance of self-service stores. A very signiﬁ  cant expan-
sion of the hard discounters can also be observed, as well 
(1) It should also be noted that there is no agreement on how this market can be 
carved up into categories. Therefore classiﬁ  cations may vary from one source to 
another, and also explain slight inconsistencies between the data presented, which 
nonetheless do not ever cast doubt on the ﬁ  ndings drawn from them.










































































































































CHART 4  STRUCTURE OF NON-SPECIALISED FOOD RETAILING
Source : AC Nielsen.
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Germany France The Netherlands
Hard discounters 
(Aldi and Lidl 
in Belgium)
as a general increase in large outlet retailing, i.e. in the 
very biggest stores, and a concomitan downward trend 
in small-scale outlets (with retail ﬂ  oor space of less than 
400 m²). Nevertheless, a slight increase in the number of 
small shops has been noted these last few years, which 
can be attributed to the boom in new types of local shops.
These developments are also evident from changes in 
market share of the various types of sales outlet, with 
the traditional retailers losing market share, a signiﬁ  cant 
expansion in the hard discounters’ share and an increase 
for the supermarket chains. Moreover, loss of market 
share can be observed for medium-scale retailers and a 
very slight improvement for the mini-markets (superettes), 
for the above-mentioned reason.
The market share held by supermarkets of over 1,000 m² 
is higher in Belgium than in the euro area and than the 
average of the three neighbouring countries. Only France 
has a bigger market share, mainly due to the very high 
market share of the hypermarkets, the highest of the euro 
area. The growing predominance of the biggest retail 
outlets over the smallest outlets is a widespread trend in 
Europe  (1).
(1)  The slightly different pattern in France could be explained by legislation that is more 
protective of the big supermarkets which, owing to the fact that large-scale outlets 
were highly developed to start with, limited their expansion to the advantage of 
smaller outlets, for which the legislation was probably relatively less restrictive. 
Moreover, the expansion of the hard discount stores, where retail ﬂ  oor space has 
generally tended to be less than 1,000 m², could account for roughly half of the 
growth recorded by outlets with 400 to 999 m² of ﬂ  oor space (the hard discount 
market share in France rose from 10 to 14 p.c. between 2001 and 2007).
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The growth of the hard discounters (currently Aldi and 
Lidl in Belgium) is a very pronounced development – both 
in terms of numbers and market share – taking place in 
Belgium as well as in the rest of Europe. In Belgium, it is 
further boosted by a signiﬁ  cant increase in market share 
held by the soft discounters (like Colruyt) whose stock also 
includes main brands  (1), while the hard discounters gener-
ally tend to limit their products to generic brands or brands 
which they market exclusively. This trend is also spreading 
to the strategy of other types of supermarkets which are 
increasingly adding own-brand goods to their product 
range, i.e. in-house brands in the name of the distribu-
tor’s store or generic brands. Together, these own brands 
(including the hard discounters’ store brands) accounted 
for 31 p.c. of retail trade turnover in Belgium in 2007. 
These developments can be interpreted as a sign of com-
petitive forces at play in the non-specialised food market.
In terms of market share held by the discounters (hard and 
soft), Belgium thus lies in third place in Western Europe, 
behind Germany and Norway. This ranking is mainly due 
to the size of the soft discounters’ segment, but the hard 
discounters’ market share also exceeds the average share 
observed in the euro area, Belgium coming in third place 
in the European rankings in this respect, behind Austria, 
and of course Germany, the country where the concept 
originated and which later exported it elsewhere.  
Apart from the hard discounters which, according to 
Marketing Map, together have a market share of 16 p.c. 
putting them in 4th and 7th position on the Belgian market 
(respectively Aldi and Lidl), the four biggest distribution 
groups in Belgium (Carrefour, Colruyt, Delhaize Le Lion, 
and Louis Delhaize) account for 76 p.c. of the market for 
self-service food retailing  (2). When Makro is added to this 
quartet, the overall market share rises to 82 p.c. And, if 
the above-mentioned hard discounters are added too, 
the market share goes up to 98 p.c. for the seven main 
distribution groups in Belgium. 
A conventional way of measuring concentration is with 
the Herﬁ  ndahl-Hirschmann index (HHI). This is a yardstick 
used by the anti-trust authorities (in the United States as 
well as in the European Union).The index is obtained by 
adding up the squares of market share of all enterprises 
in a sector. The higher the HHI for a given market, the 
more production is concentrated in the hands of a small 
number of ﬁ  rms. A result of less than 1,000 indicates a 
low degree of concentration, between 1,000 and 1,800 
is average concentration and over 1,800 points to a high 
degree of concentration  (3).
The HHI for Belgium varies from 1,720 (on the basis of 
retail ﬂ  oor area) to 1,890 (on the basis of the turnover of 
the seven biggest groups), which suggests an average to 
high degree of concentration at the national level. By way 
of comparison, the seven main distribution groups in the 
United Kingdom accounted for 77 p.c. of total market 
share in 2007, which works out at an IHH of 1,400, or 
average concentration, and less than that measured in 
Belgium. Data for France and Germany (2002/2003) show 
that concentration there is weaker than in Belgium, while 
it is stronger in the Netherlands. 
However, there are many reasons to believe that the 
market to be taken into consideration for calculating 
the degree of concentration is not actually the national 
market. Supermarkets do tend to be more active on local 
markets. So, the HHI at national level is no longer really 
suitable. It is in fact liable to under-estimate the degree of 
concentration if retail stores were to share the territory, so 
that the market would be marked by a lack of competi-
tion at local level. Moreover, an HHI calculated at local 
level is not comparable with a national-level index if at 
local level the size of the market determines the optimum 
number of competitors  : a market with three competi-
tors could be considered as optimal in view of the size of 
the local market, but in this case the HHI would indicate 
a high level of concentration according to the above-
mentioned scale. 
CHART 5  MARKET SHARES IN FOOD RETAILING IN BELGIUM 
(2007 TURNOVER)
 (percentages)
Source : Marketing Map.
Carrefour Group (25.7)








(1) Also called “national brands”, these are agri-food industry brands whose image 
generally tends to be supported by advertising and which are not linked to any 
particular retailer.
(2) Grouping together the different brands per distribution chain is not always easy, 
as the links between the brand name and the group are not always of the same 
intensity. The degree of autonomy of outlets can also be quite high.
(3)  In a theoretical situation with an inﬁ  nite number of competitors of equivalent size, 
the market share of each competitor will tend to be near zero and the HHI will be 
nil. Conversely, in the case of a monopoly (with a market share of 100 p.c.), the 
HHI will reach 10,000.






















CHART 6  LOCATION OF FOOD RETAIL STORES IN BELGIUM AND IN THE BORDER ZONES


















Location of retail outlets :
In Belgium
In the border zones :
In France
In the Netherlands
In Germany (non-exhaustive data, not available for some regions)
In Luxembourg (non-exhaustive data)
p.m. Main towns in Belgium and the border zones
In order to apply a local approach to Belgium, the most 
detailed data possible on supermarkets have been used. 
The main source consists of information provided by the 
FPS Economy’s planology service in the form of a list of 
retail trade outlets active in Belgium. This sort of list seems 
to be the only one of its kind in Europe. It is updated every 
year. The version used in this part of the analysis is the list 
closed on 31 December 2007. Apart from the name and 
address of the sales outlet, this list of more than 8,500 
shops includes information on the retail surface area and 
the business sector, which makes it possible to select just 
the self-service food retail trade outlets, for which the list 
is exhaustive. It covers 3,731 self-service food outlets of 
more than 100 m² of retail ﬂ  oor space. The novelty of the 
following analysis lies in the possibility of transforming 
the list into a geographical database, using geocoding 
services that enable addresses to be transformed into geo-
graphical data like those used by GPS navigation systems. 
The geographical features can thus be used to analyse the 
local aspects of the self-service food retail market.
One of the ﬁ   rst things to be noted is that population 
density is evidently the main determinant of market size 
and therefore of the number of shops, as well as the total 
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supply of retail outlets. The map of self-service food retail 
outlets of more than 100 m² clearly illustrates the link 
between the number of shops and population size or eco-
nomic clusters as well as major road axes (characteristics 
which are strongly correlated amongst themselves). The 
most concentrated zones are the area around Brussels, 
between Brussels and Ghent, between Brussels and 
Antwerp, between Antwerp and Hasselt down to Liège, 
the Walloon ridge running from Mons and Charleroi to 
Namur and Liège, the region around Kortrijk and the 
coast. Conversely, southern Wallonia and the province of 
Luxembourg in particular evidently have a lower density 
of shops, directly linked to the lowest population density, 
which means a smaller market. It is also interesting to 
note that the province of Luxembourg, which has a very 
small number of shops per square kilometre, does actually 
have a higher number of shops per inhabitant than the 
other provinces. If supermarkets are singled out accord-
ing to size among the sales outlets in Belgium, the above 
observations remain generally valid. The location of the 
biggest supermarkets is even more closely correlated with 
population density, and so these stores are even more 
under-represented in the south of the Walloon Region.
The same type of geographical breakdown can be noted 
in the neighbouring countries  (1). On the map, a high 
concentration of shops can be seen in the region around 
Lille in France and towards Mons either side of Kortrijk, 
where the population density is high. Conversely, along 
the border with the “Boot” of Hainaut or the province 
of Luxembourg, shop density – as in the corresponding 
part of Belgium – is markedly lower, with the exception 
of the France-Belgium-Luxembourg border region. Along 
the rest of the Belgo-Luxembourg border, shop density 
is also relatively low (although the data for Luxembourg 
are not exhaustive). The situation is undoubtedly similar 
along the border with Germany, but here too, there is 
a lack of data. Around Aachen and towards Maastricht, 
the number of shops again increases signiﬁ  cantly, still in 
relation to economic activity and population. The situation 
(1)  On the basis of additional data gathered from national sources, it has been possible 
to draw up the map of self-service food retail outlets in border areas. In some cases, 
the variables, like the shops’ retail ﬂ  oor space, have had to be estimated – at least 
in part. In other cases (Germany, Luxembourg), the sources are not exhaustive. 
In all, roughly 2,800 sales outlets have been identiﬁ  ed in the four neighbouring 
countries. More than 2,200 of them are located less than 50 kilometres away from 
an outlet in Belgium. Logically, this ﬁ  gure decreases over the distance considered : 
there are just under 1,000 within 15 km of a shop in Belgium, around 500 at 10 
km and roughly 221 within 5 kilometres. The distance is generally shorter in France 
than in the Netherlands.
CHART 7  LOCATION OF FOOD RETAIL STORES WITH SIGNIFICANT MARKET POWER (1)
Sources : Atlas Commercial SaarLorLux (DE, LU), FPS Economy (BE), Google Maps (DE), INSEE (FR), KVH(NL), Grand Duchy of Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce (LU), NBB.
(1)  Market share (estimated on the basis of retail floor space) of over 60 p.c. This is calculated as consolidated market share at group level, taking account of shops in border 
areas.
Radius of 5 km for all shops Radius of 5 km for local shops
10 km for medium-sized shops
15 km for large shops
Local shops (<280 m2)
Medium-sized supermarkets (between 280 and 140 m2)
Big supermarkets (>1400 m2)
p.m. Main towns in Belgium and the border zones
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Box 2 – Measuring the degree of local competition
Drawing on the ﬁ  ndings of a study published in 2008 by the anti-trust authority in the United Kingdom, the UK 
Competition Commission (UKCC), the degree of competition at local level has been measured for Belgium on the 
basis of data supermarket siting. 
First of all, the reference markets are deﬁ  ned in terms of shop size. According to the UKCC report, consumers 
do not actually consider different sized shops as perfect substitutes for each other. So, in the case of the big 
supermarkets, the nearest substitute is another large supermarket  : following a small but signiﬁ  cant increase in 
prices, the majority of consumers who change store will move towards a large outlet, but not towards small or 
medium-sized outlets. Therefore, the big shops are mainly (as opposed to only, assumed in the exercise) inﬂ  uenced 
by competition from other large stores. In our exercise, they are deﬁ  ned as shops with a retail trading space 
of more than 1,400 m². Medium-sized shops (retail ﬂ  oor space of between 280 and 1,400 m²) not only face 
competition from other stores of a similar size, but also from big stores. On the other hand, small shops (retail ﬂ  oor 
space of less than 280 m²) are not relevant competitors for medium-sized stores. Finally, small shops are subject to 
competition from three types of store. That makes it possible to deﬁ  ne three reference markets.
In a second step, a local or geographical dimension is added to this deﬁ  nition depending on supermarket size. 
The UKCC study shows that the big supermarkets generally tend to compete with the other large supermarkets 
located within an isochronal radius of 10 to 15 minutes by car around each shop. In the absence of detailed 
data on journey times in Belgium at such a speciﬁ  c level, the analysis set out below measures these isochrones 
approximately by a radius of 5, 10 or 15 km around each shop “as the crow ﬂ  ies”. In Belgium’s case, it is also 
important to take cross-border competition into consideration. Comparable data have been able to be found 
for France and the Netherlands, but for Germany and Luxembourg, only partial data are available. Therefore, 

along the remainder of the border between Belgium and 
the Netherlands reveals a high degree of concentration 
quite uniformly spread out, in line with the high popula-
tion density in the Netherlands.
Taking the analysis a notch higher, it is possible to 
measure the degree of competition at the local level in 
Belgium. Box 2 sets out the concepts and the main ﬁ  nd-
ings drawn from two studies abroad, one for the United 
Kingdom and the other for France. Overall, the indica-
tors obtained put the ﬁ  ndings from the comparison of 
national Herﬁ   ndahl indices (HHI) into perspective  : the 
number of shops with signiﬁ  cant market power at local 
level appears to be lower in Belgium than in the United 
Kingdom and France. This indicates higher local competi-
tion despite a higher HHI. 
Furthermore, the map pinpointing sales outlets with sig-
niﬁ  cant market power shows that, in most cases, they are 
sales outlets located in less favourable markets, that is, 
in regions with a lower population density, situations for 
which the deﬁ  nition of the local market (the length of the 
radius) itself is maybe inadequate, since households there 
are used to travelling longer distances to get to shops 
and other services. It is particularly striking for local shops 
(a market radius of 5 km) and average-size supermarkets 
(a market radius of 10 km), almost all located in the 
least populated part of Wallonia. In the case of the big 
supermarkets, it is obvious that the shift from a narrowly-
deﬁ  ned market (5 km) to a wider market (15 km) reduces 
the number of market power situations signiﬁ  cantly. A 
good many of the remaining potentially problematical 
cases are again located in southern Wallonia.
To sum up, these indications suggest that the siting 
of supermarkets is in line with expectations and does 
not seem to show any sign of widespread problems. 
Moreover, competition at local level seems to be play-
ing its role relatively well in Belgium, even though this 
situation is largely attributable to high population density. 
Cross-checking the rather qualiﬁ  ed interpretation of the 
market regulation indicators for setting up supermarkets 
presented in chapter 1, this analysis suggests that the 
actual impact of these regulatory requirements, which are 
generally felt to be strict, on the degree of competition at 
the relevant local level is fairly small. 
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the results that take the cross-border market into account are, in principle, the most relevant, but they slightly 
underestimate actual competition in practice, especially in the regions near Germany and Luxembourg.
The indicator of the degree of competition at local level used in the UKCC study is the number of shops with a 
market share (on their relevant local market) of more than 60 p.c. This ﬁ  gure is then expressed as a percentage of 
the total of all the shops. The same indicator has been used, but the market share has had to be calculated on the 
basis of the retail ﬂ  oor space of the shops, and not on the basis of turnover (owing to a lack of data on turnover 
per individual store). Moreover, account must be taken of the fact that other shops belonging to (or associates 
of) the same group are also active on the geographical market of a given store, which de facto reduces effective 
competition, since group strategies can be put in place. Therefore, this exercise has also taken into consideration 
an indicator based on group consolidated market share. This indicator, in principle more relevant, can nevertheless 
over-estimate somewhat the lack of competition, and for two reasons. First of all, there is a slight risk of double 
counting  : since several shops belonging to the same group and operating in close proximity can in turn be 
identiﬁ  ed as having market power, while several of them actually share this power. Secondly, it is not impossible 
that, in some cases, shops run by self-employed owners or franchisees also compete with each other, even within 
the same group. This can be relatively signiﬁ  cant in the case of small and medium-sized shops. 
SHOPS WITH SIGNIFICANT MARKET POWER ON THEIR LOCAL MARKET














  Belgium  (1)
Radius of 5 km ............................. 13.1 3.1 3.1
(12.6) (2.9) (n.)
Radius of 10 km  ........................... 3.0 0.3
(2.8) (0.2)
Radius of 15 km  ........................... 1.2
(0.9)
  Belgium – with group consolidated market share  (2)
Radius of 5 km ............................. 28.1 5.1 3.8
(27.5) (4.8) (n.)
Radius of 10 km  ........................... 14.0 1.1
(13.5) (0.9)
Radius of 15 km  ........................... 9.6
(7.3)
p.m. United Kingdom  .......................   (n = 1,853)   (n = 4,265)
 10-minute  drive   .......................   27   22   n.
 15-minute  drive   .......................   11   10   n.
Sources :  UKCC,  NBB.
(1) Market share, estimated on the basis of retail ﬂoor space, higher than 60 p.c. 
(2) Market share, estimated on the basis of retail ﬂoor space and consolidated at group level, higher than 60 p.c.
 

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Turning to big supermarkets, as deﬁ  ned by a radius of 5 km, it was found that 28 p.c. of them have signiﬁ  cant 
power when group consolidated market shares are taken into account. By extending the radius to 10 km or to 15 
km, which appears to be a more suitable distance for distinguishing the potential market for a large supermarket, 
it emerges that there are, respectively, no more than 14 p.c. or only 9.6 p.c. of supermarkets that can be regarded 
as having a market power according to the deﬁ  nition used. Although taking cross-border trade into account has 
a marginal inﬂ  uence on the overall results, the impact is signiﬁ  cant for the border zones. 
Corresponding ﬁ  gures available for the United Kingdom are quite similar, with 27 p.c. to 11 p.c. of large 
supermarkets in a position of strength on their market. However, as the deﬁ  nition of signiﬁ  cant power power 
in the UKCC study imposes an additional criterion (that there are only three competitors or less) and as it is 
based on non consolidated market share, it can be concluded that local competition seems to be stronger in 
Belgium. 
As far as the market for medium-sized supermarkets is concerned, the share of sales outlets considered as being 
in a dominant position on the markets within a radius of 5 to 10 km varies between 5.1 and 1.1 p.c., rates well 
below those recorded in the United Kingdom, which suggest that competition is rife in this segment. With only 
3.8 p.c. of sales outlets in a position of strength on a market within a 5 km radius, the ﬁ  nding is similar for local 
shops. In practice, however, these results are less relevant than in the case of medium- to large-scale supermarkets 
in that a narrower geographical market, within a radius of 1 km for example, should be taken into consideration 
to determine the market on which other local shops are rivals. Moreover, other small retail trade outlets (mini-
markets of less than 100 m² and specialised shops) which are probably part of the same market should also be 
taken into account.
These conclusions are further conﬁ  rmed by a robustness test based on a second survey covering France, which 
was carried out in 2008 by Asterop, a (geo)marketing research consultancy  (1). Drawing on the ﬁ  ndings of this 
study, the local dimension has been measured approximately by a circle with a radius of 18.5 km2  (2). The indicator 
used measures the number of local markets dominated by one or two “leaders”. A market dominated by just 
one group corresponds to a market where the leader has a market share of at least 25 p.c. and a 10 point lead 
in terms of market share over the second biggest retailer  (3). A market dominated by two groups has been deﬁ  ned 
by analogy by taking as the starting point the combined market share of the two groups with the biggest shares. 
This suggests that 35 p.c. of supermarkets in Belgium would display some form of market power. That appears to 
be well below the situation described for France where 87 p.c. of all zones investigated are marked by a lack of 
competition. These differences can most probably be explained by the fact that France has a bigger proportion of 
large supermarkets, with a lower population density than in Belgium, as well as – until only recently – legislation 
tending to protect existing supermarkets.
These ﬁ  ndings suggest that, on the whole, competition can play its role at the local level without any major 
obstacles in Belgium.
(1)  A summary of the study is available on the following webpage : http ://www.asterop.com/fr/etudes/localenseignes.aspx .
(2)  The reference study in fact deﬁ  nes 630 “zones de vie” of varying size, corresponding to geographically delimited areas that have been studied specially to best reﬂ  ect 
economic reality, unlike the standard administrative division of regions and districts (départements, cantons, etc.). The average size of a zone corresponds to a circle 
with a radius of 18.5 km. 
(3)  15 points if the market leader has a share of more than 40 p.c. of the market.
4. Price Level
The aim of this section is to analyse Belgium’s position in 
relation to the euro area and its three main neighbours 
(Germany, France and the Netherlands) in terms of prices 
charged by the retail trade sector. This analysis is based on 
two sources of information, used in many other research 
papers (Allington, Kattuman and Waldmann, 2005  ; 
Rogers, 2007, for example).
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Box 3 – The three reference baskets and the three comparison baskets
The reference baskets
The Eurostat basket is made up of 13 product categories sold by retail trade sector ﬁ  rms. These categories are  : 
Bread and cereals, Meat, Fish, Milk, cheese and eggs, Oils and fats, Fruit and vegetables (including potatoes), 
Other food products, Non-alcoholic beverages, Alcoholic beverages, Tobacco, Clothing and footwear, Furniture, 
household equipment and cleaning products, Various goods and services. These products cover categories 01, 02, 
03, 05 and 12 of the international COICOP classiﬁ  cation.
The “CityData – Supermarkets” and “CityData – Small retailers” baskets are made up of 88 products  : white 
bread, butter, margarine, rice, spaghetti, ﬂ  our, sugar, cheese, cornﬂ  akes, yoghurt, milk, olive oil, maize and 
peanut oil, potatoes, onions, mushrooms, tomatoes, carrots, oranges, apples, lemons, bananas, lettuce, eggs, 
peas, canned tomatoes, canned peaches, canned sliced pineapple, ﬁ  let mignon, steak, stewing beef, roast 
beef, minced beef, veal chops, veal ﬁ  llet, roast veal, leg of lamb, lamb chops, stewing lamb, pork chops, pork 
loin, ham, bacon, frozen chicken, fresh chicken, ﬁ  sh ﬁ  ngers, fresh ﬁ  sh, instant coffee, ground coffee, tea bags, 
cocoa, chocolate drink, coca-cola, tonic water, mineral water, orange juice, table wine, superior quality wine, 
ﬁ  ne wine, local-brand beer, top-quality beer, whisky, gin, vermouth, cognac, liqueur, soap, laundry detergent, 
toilet tissue, washing-up liquid, insect-killer spray, electric light bulbs, batteries, frying pan, toaster, laundry, 
dry cleaning (man’s suit, woman’s dress, trousers), aspirins, razor blades, toothpaste, facial tissues hand lotion, 
shampoo, lipstick, cigarettes (2 brands).
The leading source is Eurostat. The EU’s statistical institute 
publishes relative price indices (the purchasing power 
parities index) making it possible to compare the relative 
position of prices in a Member State of the European 
Union with the average for the EU15. The data used in 
this article cover the period running from 1995 to 2007 
and concern the relative price of a selection of products 
sold mainly by ﬁ  rms in the retail trade sector (NACE 52), 
namely food and beverages, clothing and footwear, clean-
ing products and household equipment and toiletries. The 
second source of information is the CityData database 
produced by the Economic Intelligence Unit. The objective 
of this database is to provide detailed information on the 
cost of living in 140 towns (mainly capital cities or very big 
towns), across the world, on the basis of price lists from a 
standard basket of products. These data are available on 
an annual basis for the period 1990-2008.
Unlike the Eurostat data, the CityData statistics describe 
the price level expressed in local currency units for a 
basket of identical goods and services in each country. In 
addition, the available data relate to individual products 
and not to a grouping of products. They therefore enable 
a closer comparison between countries. Lastly, unlike the 
Eurostat database, the CityData statistics make it possible 
to distinguish between prices charged in different types 
of shops (small retailers, supermarkets and hypermarkets, 
clothing retail chains, etc.). While this database may have 
some advantages over the ﬁ  gures published by Eurostat 
(observation of the price levels, product homogeneity, 
segmentation by type of retailer), it also has a few disad-
vantages, notably in terms of representativeness of the 
price lists (geographical scope limited to large towns and 
capital cities, basket representative of the consumption of 
a manager in a multinational enterprise).
Drawing on these two sources, three reference bas-
kets have been constructed depending on the type of 
retail outlet  : a Eurostat basket made up of 13 product 
categories, a “CityData – Supermarkets” basket and a 
“CityData – Small retailers” basket both composed of 88 
products. Three other comparison baskets have also been 
constructed on the basis of CityData ﬁ   gures  : a basket 
of 16 products sold by small clothing outlets, the same 
basket for clothes shops belonging to retail chains, and a 
basket of 36 products (excluding clothes) and services not 
sold in supermarkets and hypermarkets. The composition 
of these baskets is explained in box 3.

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An analysis of the price differentials calculated from the 
Eurostat and CityData – Supermarkets baskets shows that 
the differential between prices charged in Belgium and 
in the euro area is generally positive. In 2007, it came to 
7.7 p.c. on the basis of the Eurostat basket and 8.7 p.c. 
according to the CityData – Supermarkets basket (7.8 p.c. 
in 2008 according to this source). So, these two sources 
give consistent indications. This positive differential can 
mainly be attributed to the fact that prices in the southern 
member countries of the euro area are generally lower 
than those charged in Belgium, in particular in Spain (aver-
age differential of 19 p.c. in 2007 according to Eurostat), 
Portugal (average differential of 20.5 p.c. in 2007 accord-
ing to Eurostat) and Greece (average differential of 8.7 p.c. 
in 2007 according to Eurostat). On the other hand, as far 
as small retail stores are concerned, the data available 
indicate that the average price level surveyed in Belgium 
does not appear to differ signiﬁ  cantly from the average 
level recorded in the euro area as a whole. 
Compared with price levels in the three neighbouring 
countries, there is almost no difference between the 
Eurostat and CityData – Supermarkets baskets up to the 
year 2004. However, from 2005 onwards, a signiﬁ  cant 
increase in the average differential can be observed, espe-
cially for prices recorded in the supermarkets. On average, 
over the last four years for which data are available, prices 
charged by supermarkets and hypermarkets in Belgium 
have been 7.1 p.c. higher than those charged by our neigh-
bours, according to the CityData – Supermarkets basket. 
Based on the Eurostat basket, the average differential over 
the period 2005-2007 was 5.9 p.c. On the other hand, if 
the CityData – Small retailers basket is considered, prices 
charged in Belgium have been on average 5 p.c. lower than 
prices in Germany, France and the Netherlands since 1997. 
The comparison baskets
The “CityData – Clothes – Small retailers” and “CityData – Clothes – Chain stores” baskets are composed of 
the 16 following items : suit (man’s), shoes (man’s), raincoat (man’s), dress, shoes (woman’s), cardigan (woman’s), 
raincoat (woman’s), stockings, jeans (children’s), shoes (children’s), sports shoes (children’s), dress (children’s), jacket 
(children’s), trousers (children’s).
The “Citydata – Products and services not sold in retail stores” basket is composed of 36 items  : drink at a bar 
of a Hilton-type hotel, fast-food snack, car hire (two vehicle categories), room in a Hilton-type hotel, room in a 
moderate hotel, simple meal in a restaurant, two-course meal for two in a restaurant, baby-sitter, hourly rate 
for domestic cleaning, consultation with the dentist (two types of service), golf course green fee, swimming 
pool entrance fee, tennis court hire, CD, cinema ticket, theatre or concert ticket, local newspaper, international 
newspaper, international magazine, coulour photo ﬁ  lm, novel, unleaded petrol, taxi (3 tarifs), car tune-up in the 
garage, electricity, gas, telephone (land line, local call) and water.
To sum up, the two comparisons point to a sharp deterio-
ration in Belgium’s relative position in terms of price levels 
since 2005. This worsening of Belgium’s score concerns 
its relative position vis-à-vis its neighbours and, according 
to the CityData database, is mainly to be found in the 
retail sale in non-specialised stores sector (NACE sector 
52.1). Using the data from the three comparison baskets, 
the analysis of price differentials between Belgium and its 
three neighbours does not actually point to any deteriora-
tion of Belgium’s relative position.
As regards the two clothing baskets, starting from an 
average handicap of 10 p.c. in 1995, a very favour-
able trend can be noted for the price of clothes sold in 
shops belonging to retail chains, leading to an average 
price differential of –28 p.c. in 2008. The price situa-
tion among small fashion retailers seems to be leaning 
structurally in Belgium’s favour, with an average price 
differential of –15.5 p.c. over the years from 1995 to 
2008. However, it should be pointed out that these 
two baskets of goods only include 16 products, which 
limits their representativeness and ampliﬁ  es the effect of 
outliers on the average. 
One factor that might explain the fairly average range of 
lower prices for products sold in shops other than super-
markets and hypermarkets may be linked to the speciﬁ  c 
nature of the CityData database. As mentioned above, 
the prices published in this database are only gathered in 
the big towns. In Belgium’s case, sample prices are only 
taken from Brussels. For Germany, data are only available 
for the cities of Frankfurt, Munich, Berlin and Hamburg 
and in France, only for Paris and Lyon. And ﬁ  nally, for 
the Netherlands, price samples are only available for 
Amsterdam.
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CHART 8  AVERAGE PRICE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN BELGIUM AND THE EURO ZONE AND THE AVERAGE FOR THE THREE MAIN 
NEIGHBOURS (1)
  (percentage points, difference between Belgium and the reference zone)
Sources : Eurostat, CityData.
A black (red) marker indicates a significantly positive (negative) price differential, at a significance threshold of 5 p.c.
EUROSTAT CITYDATA – Supermarkets
CITYDATA – Small retailers
Euro area
Three main neighbours
Taking account of the speciﬁ  cities of the towns in which 
the price samples are collected, the favourable price 
differential seen in Belgium for these three comparison 
baskets can be largely attributable to the lower cost of 
commercial ﬂ  oor space there. According to the CityData 
database, the average annual cost of renting one square 
metre of ofﬁ  ce space, during the period from 2000 to 
2007, varied from 328.75 euro in Brussels, and 362.72 
euro in Germany (Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich, Hamburg), 
to 546.94 euro in France (Paris, Lyon) and 418.38 euro 
in Amsterdam. This indicator is probably a good proxy 
for the cost of a commercial lease for a small shop, but 
not necessarily for a large retail outlet in which case 
other factors inﬂ  uence the cost per m² (legal constraints 
for establishing the shop, siting on the outskirts of big 
towns, etc.).
The indicators discussed above point up a distinctive trend 
in prices in the big retail outlets in Belgium in comparison 
with the three neighbouring countries. A more in-depth 
analysis of the price situation vis-à-vis these three coun-
tries shows that the deterioration observed from 2005 
onwards is mainly due to the relative price situation in 
Belgium compared with the Netherlands, and to a lesser 
extent with Germany. 
The average price differential with the Netherlands in 
fact widened from 5.5 p.c. over the period 1995-2004 to 
23.3 p.c. for the period 2005-2008, using the CityData – 
Supermarkets basket. When compared with Germany, the 
average differential rose from 4.7 p.c. in the 1995-2004 
reference period to 8.9 p.c. for the recent period, accord-
ing to the same source. The price differential with France, 




























































































CHART 9  AVERAGE PRICE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN BELGIUM AND GERMANY, FRANCE AND THE NETHERLANDS (1)
  (percentage points, difference between Belgium and the reference zone)
Sources : Eurostat, CityData.
A black (red) marker indicates a significantly positive (negative) price differential, at a significance threshold of 5 p.c.




however, is rarely signiﬁ  cant. The CityData statistics for 
the period 2005-2008 show that average prices in super-
markets in Belgium were not signiﬁ  cantly different from 
the average price in the French supermarkets.
A similar trend can be seen from the Eurostat data, even 
though differences in price levels are evident. For exam-
ple, the average differential with Germany goes up from 
0.6 p.c. in the years from 1995 to 2004 to 4.9 p.c. over 
the period 2005-2007. Compared with the Netherlands, 
the average differential is 6.5 p.c. over the period from 
1995 to 2004 and 16.8 p.c. over the period 2005-2007. 
A notable difference can be observed for France. 
According to Eurostat, the average price differential with 
France turned signiﬁ  cantly positive in 2007.
Theoretically, two major sources of divergence can be put 
forward to explain price differences between two countries 
that are members of an economic and monetary union. 
Firstly, the higher prices in Belgium might mirror larger 
operating margins, reﬂ  ecting a lower degree of competi-
tion than in the neighbouring countries. Using the EU 
KLEMS database, Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) 
estimated mark-up rates in several euro area countries 
for all the NACE sectors, over the period 1981-2004. 
Their estimates for the retail trade sector (NACE 52) 
show that the mark-up in Belgium (21 p.c.) is lower than 
that obtained for the euro area (42 p.c.) and also France 
(24 p.c.) and the Netherlands (39 p.c.). It is nevertheless 
higher than that observed in Germany (12 p.c.). The 
unfavourable price differential observed vis-à-vis the 
Netherlands does not therefore seem to be the result of 
an unfavourable proﬁ  t margin differential. On the other 
hand, the price differential with Germany could reﬂ  ect 
lower margins in Germany, associated with a higher 
market share held by the hard discounters.
Secondly, cost factors speciﬁ  c to the different countries 
can also affect price differentials per product. Retailers’ 
production costs, in particular, can vary considerably 
depending on local conditions.
Since 2005, labour costs have risen faster in Belgium 
than in the three neighbouring countries, and especially 
Germany. This factor can therefore also help to explain 
the changes in the price differential with this country. Yet, 
the deterioration in the price differential observed vis-à-vis 
the Netherlands from 2004 onwards does not seem to 
be explained by an unfavourable trend in labour costs in 
Belgium compared with its Dutch neighbour.
The reason behind the rather unfavourable trend in the 
supermarket price differential between Belgium and the 
Netherlands in fact lies in a price war among the main 
Dutch retailers. In a bid to (re)gain market share, Dutch 
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CHART 10  RELATIVE CHANGES IN LABOUR COSTS PER HOUR 
WORKED
  (percentage points, difference between Belgium and the 
reference zone)





retailer Albert Heijn decided to cut the price of over 
1,000 products in October 2003. Its main competitors 
immediately followed suit, which triggered a wave of 
price cuts on certain consumer goods, and mainly food 
products. In December 2006, the Albert Heijn group 
announced that it had reached its market share target 
and normal competition conditions returned. According 
to Van Heerde, Gijsbrechts and Pauwels (2008), this price 
war appears to have resulted in an 8.2 p.c. reduction in 
the price of food products. It should be noted that this 
price war was declared in a competitive context which 
seemed to be marked by high margins (39 p.c. accord-
ing to Christopoulou and Vermeulen, 2008), which gave 
ﬁ  rms operating in the sector wide possibilities for cutting 
prices. Based on estimates made by Christopoulou and 
Vermeulen (2008), Belgian companies did not have such 
wide margins of manoeuvre. 
Although Albert Heijn’s Dutch rivals reacted to these price 
cuts, this particular price war does not seem to have 
extended beyond Dutch borders  ; at least, it does not 
appear to have spread to Belgian retailers, which could 
suggest that retail markets are still relatively geographi-
cally fragmented. It can not be ruled out that the super-
markets located near the Dutch border agreed to some 
price reductions without this trend spreading to the whole 
of the Belgian retail distribution sector.
Box 4 – Price war, causes and consequences
A price war is a phase of price-cutting that leads all stakeholders on a given market to follow the initial 
price reduction (Urbany and Dickson, 1991). Unlike a situation of normal competition, a price war generates 
unsustainable price levels in the long term. Heil and Helsen (2001) reckon that there is a price war when the 
following seven conditions have been fulﬁ  lled : (1) market players pay more attention to their competitors’ than the 
consumers’ reactions, (2) at ﬁ  rst sight, the reaction of all stakeholders to the initial price cut is not something to 
be desired, (3) none of the stakeholders deliberately wants to trigger the price war, (4) the competitors’ reaction is 
not an “ordinary” reaction, (5) price responses are faster than usual, (6) prices come down, and (7) the downward 
movement in prices is not sustainable. 
An important factor triggering a price war is competition among new entrants. A price war can therefore be due 
to the implementation of policies aimed at facilitating access to a particular market. However, the introduction of 
structural reform measures does not necessarily spark a price war. A deterioration of economic conditions, weak 
loyalty to a brand or high sensitivity of consumers to price levels can also be triggering factors. 
Firms that launch into a price war hope to regain market share by improving their image in the eyes of consumers 
and by squeezing out a series of competitors, which then boosts their market power (and thus their proﬁ  t 
expectations) in the long term  (1). On the whole, however, it seems that a price war has relatively negative effects 
for enterprises operating in the sector.

(1)  For example, when the Carrefour group took over the GB hypermarket and supermarket chain in July 2000, the French group had announced that it intended to lead 
a price war in order to regain market share.
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As regards the price war that raged in the retail distribution sector in the Netherlands, at the beginning of the 
millennium Albert Heijn was faced not only with an unfavourable macroeconomic context, but also with a loss 
of market share due to the arrival of the hard discounters Aldi and Lidl on the Dutch market. Moreover, it had 
damaged its image by almost pricing itself out of the market. At the end of the price-war episode, its image among 
consumers as far as prices were concerned had improved signiﬁ  cantly and one rival (Edah) had been squeezed 
out of the market. From a sectoral perspective, while the drop in prices has been beneﬁ  cial in the short term 
for consumers and the ﬁ  rm which started the price war, the reduction of proﬁ  t margins in the retail distribution 
sector could have negative consequences in the long run, in terms of investment in R&D or quality of the service 
provided. Furthermore, the increased concentration in the sector and the resultant drop in competition could also 
have a negative impact on price developments in the long run (rapid return to higher margins than during the 
initial period).
Overall, a price war can therefore be regarded as a phase somewhere between two equilibrium situations on 
the market. If, during this transition, the situation appears proﬁ  table for consumers, in the long term it may 
have negative consequences for them (with competition focused solely on prices to the detriment of quality, less 
investment in R&D, greater concentration in the sector).
Another way of studying the issue of price formation and 
competition in the retail distribution sector is to examine 
the price reaction observed in different countries fol-
lowing a common and identiﬁ   able shock of signiﬁ  cant 
magnitude. Such a shock has been observed in the case 
of food products, and more particularly for dairy products. 
Indeed, the price of milk on the international markets 
increased very sharply during the ﬁ  rst half of 2007 before 
falling again. Consumer prices followed suit with a lag 









































CHART 11 MILK  PRICES
  (indices for first half of 2007 = 100)
Sources : AAE, CPB (NL), DGSEI (BE), DESTATIS (DE), INSEE (FR).
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should, however, be pointed out that this approach has 
major limitations since it does not integrate the links in 
the production chain between the original producer and 
the ﬁ   nal consumer  : the change in consumer prices is 
not always exclusively the result of the retail distribution 
sector’s pricing policy. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw 
some conclusions from it.
First of all, following the initial shock, the rise in consumer 
prices for milk was very signiﬁ  cant  in  Belgium,  more 
so than in France and the Netherlands, but of a similar 
magnitude to that observed in Germany. However, the 
extent to which these upward cost trends were passed on 
through the chain does not enable any conclusions to be 
drawn about the degree of competition. A strong increase 
in consumption prices can either reﬂ  ect  uncompetitive 
price formation or quite the opposite : indeed, in a highly 
competitive environment, not passing on the rise in costs 
to the consumer is not an easy thing to do for the various 
stakeholders in the sector, from the production stage to 
distribution via the processing stage, taking account of 
their (in principle) already narrow margins. 
On the other hand, the symmetry (or lack of) between 
the initial upward phase and the downswing recorded 
since the second half of 2008 can be a sign of more (or 
less) competitive price formation. Here, Belgium seems 
to occupy a middle rank  ; while the drop in consumer 
prices following the fall in costs was not symmetric to 
the rise, nor as pronounced as in Germany, it is more 
evident than in France and the Netherlands where milk 
prices barely fell at all in 2008 and during the ﬁ  rst few 
months of 2009. 
Together with the differences observed between coun-
tries, this asymmetry between the upward and down-
ward phases may therefore suggest that price formation 
in Belgium is less competitive than in Germany, but 
comparatively more than in France or the Netherlands. 
The less favourable position of Dutch retailers, who have 
been through a price war in the recent past, could also 
be explained by the potentially harmful effects in the 
longer term of this kind of price war, as described in 
box 4.
Conclusion
The distribution sector is an essential link in the economy. 
On the one hand, owing to its own intrinsic weight in 
terms of value added or employment, it makes a major 
contribution to the overall performance of the economy, 
notably in productivity terms and, ultimately, as regards 
generation of income. On the other hand, through its 
speciﬁ  c role of getting goods to the ﬁ  nal consumer, it has 
a direct inﬂ  uence on the well-being of the consumer with 
the diversity of products on sale and via their prices.
In this respect, while the speciﬁ  c regulatory requirements 
for the sector may be justiﬁ  ed by general societal consid-
erations such as land use planning, protection of workers’ 
leisure time, etc. – or sometimes even by the need to 
take account of speciﬁ  c interests of particular groups –, 
these rules are likely to act as a brake on purely economic 
efﬁ  ciency. Despite the progress made in Belgium over the 
last few years, some of these regulatory requirements 
regularly attract the attention of the IMF and the OECD 
during their surveys of the structural position of the econ-
omy, especially since trends in activity and productivity in 
the distribution sector seem to be lagging behind those 
observed in the more dynamic European countries or in 
the United States. These developments would rather tend 
to suggest an inadequate degree of competition, which 
could lead to excessively high prices.
This article seeks to fully assess this evidence, by cross-
matching the various sources of information available. 
First of all, the OECD indicators show that the regula-
tions governing the retail distribution sector are relatively 
restrictive in Belgium. Admittedly, caution is warranted 
when using the OECD indicators, owing to the difﬁ  culty in 
translating national laws into an internationally compara-
ble ﬁ  gure. Nevertheless, the range of indices and the com-
parison of the ﬁ  ndings with legislation tend to suggest 
that, for most of the major themes tackled by the OECD, 
regulation in Belgium is among the ﬁ  ve most restrictive 
of all the countries covered. Operating conditions – the 
national character of restrictions on opening times of 
(large) shops and the monopolies over the distribution of 
certain products, notably medicines – are tightly regulated 
in Belgium and are a much greater constraint than market 
access conditions or direct price regulation.
As regards the economic performance of retail trade, it 
should be noted that, like most other economic sectors, 
the retail trade business in Belgium still has a higher 
productivity rate than in the majority of other European 
countries and even the United States too. However, unlike 
trends noted in other branches of activity, this favourable 
position has been gradually eroded over the last ten years. 
It does actually seem that Belgium’s main problem lies in 
its inability to improve the efﬁ  ciency of the production 
factors being used. So, the relatively strong growth in 
investment, notably in ICT, is offset by adverse trends in 
total factor productivity. If these developments continue, 
they could dampen the overall competitiveness of the dis-
tribution sector in Belgium and, along with the increased 
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openness to international trade that might be triggered by 
the transposition of the EU Services Directive into national 
legislation at the end of 2009, could constitute a threat 
to its sustainability.
The regulatory burden is no doubt one explanatory 
factor, but it is not the only one. To start with, the size 
of the market, as a result of the fragmentation between 
European countries, or even within Belgium itself owing 
to cultural differences, limits the opportunities to reap 
economies of scale. Then again, beyond the boundaries of 
the distribution sector, the general functioning of product 
and labour markets or the entrepreneurial spirit at play in 
the economy also come into the equation.
Despite so much regulation, no really striking anomalies 
are noted in the competitive situation in Belgium. The 
non-specialised food retail sector has a growing number 
of big shops, as well as an increasing number of hard dis-
counters. This trend towards hard discounting goes hand 
in hand with a larger share of generic brand products, 
in traditional retail outlets too. Moreover, even though 
the overall indicators point to some concentration at 
national level, local competition appears to be quite 
strong ; only a few sales outlets have a dominant position 
at local level, despite quite a restrictive degree of per-
ceived regulation. This is no doubt largely explained by 
the high population density, which tends to create local 
markets that are strong enough to be able to accept 
several competitors.
As far as price levels are concerned, both CityData and 
Eurostat’s data indicate that prices charged by the retail 
sector are higher in Belgium than in the euro area and the 
three neighbouring countries. There have also been signs 
of a recent deterioration in the differential between prices 
in the Belgian supermarkets and prices charged by the 
German and Dutch supermarkets in particular. Compared 
with Germany alone, adverse developments in labour 
costs in Belgium can go some way to explaining the trend 
in price differentials. Similarly, retail business margins 
seem to be structurally higher than in Germany (wider 
presence of hard discounters in this country no doubt 
goes a long way to explaing the low mark-ups in the retail 
distribution sector). On the other hand, the sharp deterio-
ration of the price differentials between Belgium and the 
Netherlands recorded in supermarkets can be explained 
by the price war that raged between the major Dutch 
retail groups from October 2003 to December 2006.
Overall, it therefore appears that the actual inﬂ  uence of 
speciﬁ   c regulatory requirements for the retail trade on 
the efﬁ  ciency of the sector, on the degree of competition 
and, ultimately, on consumer prices needs to be looked 
at very carefully.
On the one hand, coordinating and simplifying the many 
rules and regulations in force in Belgium would no doubt 
generate the same results in terms of consumer protec-
tion, land use planning, or other objectives, while at the 
same time breaking down the underlying barriers to entry 
for new market players caused – in terms of prior infor-
mation requirements and administrative burden – by the 
multiplication of regulatory laws. On the other hand, the 
performance of the distribution sector must be examined 
taking account of the speciﬁ  c features and general organ-
isational rules of the economy, in which it is just one link. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that a ﬂ  exible retail sector 
enjoying effective competition is a necessary precondition 
for supporting the growth potential of the economy and 
ensuring consumer satisfaction, and that also means by 
maintaining an appropriate price level.
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